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Of the four numbered operating fleets, •he U. S. Seventh Fleet has to patrol the *argest operating area—the Western Pa- c'fic, from the Bering Sea to the Straits of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean—some ^0 million square miles. Within this area are several regions where there is active conflict, including the current Vietnamese thrust into Kampuchea and the Iraq- Iran war which has spilled into the Per- stan Gulf. Several other confrontations threaten to erupt into conflict in the Seventh Fleet’s sphere of interest, including the Korean peninsula, the Vietnam-China border, and several areas bordering on the Indian Ocean and Red Sea.
The political-military environment of •he Western Pacific and Indian oceans is changing at a rapid pace, causing new Problems and challenges for the Com- •nander Seventh Fleet. Since World War *1 the military policy of the United States has been oriented generally toward a Europe-first strategy. From a naval viewpoint, this had long meant that during a Period of crisis or conflict in Europe rouch of the Pacific Fleet, including components of the Seventh Fleet, would swing to the Atlantic Fleet. In some scenarios, during periods of tension, the
Seventh Fleet would simply steam toward the Marianas area to a holding position beyond the range of most Soviet land- based aircraft while the national leadership decided how to employ the fleet.
This policy began to change in the late 1970s for a number of reasons, not the least of which was Japan's declaration of intent to secure sea areas out to 1,000 miles from the Japanese home islands. During a crisis period or conflict, the Seventh Fleet can now deploy to “action stations” closer to the Asian mainland to carry out wartime missions. This reflects the increased cooperation with key allies in the Pacific, especially Japan. Beginning in the late 1970s the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) “took note” of the Seventh Fleet maneuvers, occasionally sending observers. In 1981, a Japanese destroyer took part in a U. S. exercise, followed by more formal participation in exercises. In 1983, all. S. carrier and her embarked air wing were players in a major JMSDF exercise. (There is a parallel to be drawn with the U. S. Third Fleet’s RimPac exercise series, with Japanese participation beginning in 1978 in an observer status and working to full participation.)
The U. S. Seventh Fleet regularly exercises with other allied navies, and there is a thrust toward some form of naval cooperation with China. Following the visits to China of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman John W. Vessey, Jr., and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, a major program of technical assistance to the Chinese Navy is being developed. Eventually this move can be expected to impact on the Seventh Fleet, although a spring 1985 visit of U. S. warships to Shanghai has been “delayed indefinitely” over the issue of whether or not the U. S. ships have nuclear weapons on board. (China had permitted the naval ships of three other nuclear nations to visit its ports, those of the Soviet Union, France, and Britain. China has nuclear weapons and nuclear-propelled submarines.)
Demonstrating the growing cooperation between Japan and the United States, the Japanese helicopter-carrying destroyer Sliirane steams in company with the U. S. Seventh Fleet’s flagship, the USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19).
The Seventh Fleet’s most visible units are its two or three carrier battle groups—left to right, Midway, Coral Sea, and Enterprise—and its amphibious warfare forces—facing page, the Belleau Wood (LHA-3) in Hong Kong.
Port visits to allied nations and multinational exercises are a part of the “political” mission of the Seventh Fleet. Indeed, the case can be made that the political mission of the Seventh Fleet is more significant than, for example, that of the U. S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. In the Mediterranean the United States has a major naval command ashore (Commander U. S. Naval Forces Europe, with the additional NATO position of Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe), there are major allied navies to share in the political-military role, and the number of neutral nations is much smaller than in the Pacific-Indian Ocean area.
From a viewpoint of the fleet’s combat roles, the official mission statement of the Seventh Fleet includes the conduct of operations “to ensure control of the sea in order to defend the United States against attack through the western Pacific and Indian Oceans, to maintain the security of the Pacific command and to support the operations of adjacent allied and national commanders.” The specific missions of the Seventh Fleet will vary with the scenario of the crisis or conflict.
On a practical basis this can be translated into four primary responsibilities for the Commander Seventh Fleet:
- Countering Soviet naval forces in the Western Pacific (WestPac) and Indian Ocean
- Supporting allied forces in the defense of South Korea, especially providing tactical air power
- Assisting in the defense of Japan, especially in (1) control of the access to the Sea of Japan to ensure the safe use by Japanese, South Korean, and U. S. naval and merchant shipping, and, in wartime.
to deny the passages to Soviet ships based on the Siberian coast, and (2) prevention of Soviet assaults on Japanese territory, especially against the island of Hokkaido, separated by the La Perouse Strait from Soviet-held Sakhalin Island ► Defending allied shipping and other activities along the Asian coast
Of course, a further outbreak of hostilities in Southwest Asia or elsewhere in the Pacific-Indian Ocean area could force a reordering of these requirements.
The Commander Seventh Fleet, a vice admiral, has a force of some 60 to 75 surface ships and submarines, more than 500 ship- and land-based aircraft, and more than 55,000 Navy and Marine personnel, including most of a Marine division, to carry out these requirements. Most of the ships on forward deployments to the Seventh Fleet are from the Third Fleet, and are based at Pearl Harbor and along the U. S. West Coast. These ships normally deploy to WestPac for six- or seven- month periods. However, an aircraft carrier, a destroyer squadron, one attack submarine, and several amphibious ships are based in Japan, and several auxiliary ships are home ported at Guam.
The forces available to the Commander
Seventh Fleet for carrying out these requirements vary with ship operating schedules, exercises, activities in other areas, etc. Figure 1 shows the basic organization of the Seventh Fleet. The most visible units are the two or three carrier battle groups (CVBGs), including their screening cruisers, destroyers, and frig' ates, and the fleet’s amphibious forces. Normally there is a Marine amphibious unit (MAU) embarked in an amphibious squadron and usually a Marine battalion landing team (BLT), also afloat. The principal difference is that the MAU has a composite helicopter squadron on a helicopter carrier, while the BLT lacks this helicopter component.
At this time, the Seventh Fleet generally has one CVBG in the Northwestern Pacific, in a position to operate in the Korean peninsula area, with the second CVBG in the Indian Ocean. A third CVBG is often in transit to or from the Seventh Fleet, or assigned for exercises- bringing the fleet’s carrier strength 10 three. Six aircraft carriers are assigned to the Pacific Fleet, divided between the Third and Seventh fleets. The long deployment distances, coupled with ths one-third forward schedule, place a
Figure 1 U. S. Seventh Fleet Organization
CTF-70 Battle Force
CTF-74
Submarine Force
Commander Seventh Fleet
CTF-71 Commander (Seventh Fleet)
CTF-75
Surface Combatant Force
CTF-72 Patrol and
Reconnaissance Force
CTF-76
Amphibious Force
CTF-73
Logistic Support Force
CTF-77 Carrier Strike Force
CTF-79 Landing Force
II Marine Ampt>ib,oUS f0"'e
82
Proceedings / August 1^#-
heavy burden on the carriers and their consorts. Having the Midway (CV-41) home ported in Yokosuka, Japan, mitigates the “crunch” in the Seventh Fleet by reducing her transit time to WestPac operating areas. (The Midway is the only U. S. carrier to have ever been based outside of the United States.)
Similarly, at any given time about one- ihird of the Pacific Fleet’s 17 cruisers, 29 destroyers, 47 frigates, and various other ships are forward deployed to the Seventh Fleet. Of these ships, at this writing a total of 11 are home ported in Japan in addition to the Midway:
Darter (SS-576)/Sasebo Reeves (CG-24)/Yokosuka Towers (DDG-9)/Yokosuka Cochrane (DDG-21)/Yokosuka Oldendorf (DD-972)/Yokosuka Knox (FF-1052)/Yokosuka Lockwood (FF-1064)/Yokosuka Francis Hammond (FF-1067)/Yokosuka Kirk (FF-1087)/Yokosuka Blue Ridge (LCC-19)/Yokosuka St. Z,ou«(LKA-l 16)/Sasebo
Four auxiliary ships are based at Guam—- the Niagara Falls (AFS-3), White Plains (AFS-4), San Jose (AFS-7), and Proteus (AS-19).
The Blue Ridge (LCC-19) serves as flagship of the Commander Seventh Fleet while most of the Japan-based surface combatants are assigned to Destroyer Squadron 15. Other Seventh Fleet commands permanently based in the Far East are Carrier Group Five, Surface Group Western Pacific, Submarine Group Seven, Fleet Air Western Pacific, Patrol Wing One, and the HI Marine Amphibious Force on Okinawa. The last includes the Third Marine Division, First Marine Aircraft Wing (based in Japan and Okinawa), and Third Force Service Support Group.
Beyond the ships and their embarked aircraft, and the Marine air units, the Seventh Fleet has several squadrons of land-based patrol aircraft (VP), an electronic surveillance squadron (VQ-1), and several support squadrons (VRC-50, VC-5, and HC-5) based ashore. The VP squadrons rotate from Hawaii and West Coast bases to the Far East, where they operate under the direct control of Patrol Wing One.
Complementing these forces, the air arm of the JMSDF flies P-3 Orion and other maritime patrol/antisubmarine warfare aircraft that can operate in conjunction with Seventh Fleet aircraft in carrying out peacetime surveillance and wartime missions out to 1,000 miles from Japan. The recent acquisition of E-2C radar aircraft by Japan enhances the potential for inter-navy air operations.
Another significant allied air component in the Far East is the U. S. Air Force, with several joint operations being conducted with Air Force units based in South Korea and the Philippines, particularly with Air Force fighters and the E-3 Sentry airborne radar/control aircraft. Also, B-52G heavy bombers based on Guam are being fitted to launch Harpoon antiship missiles. They can also deliver conventional (“iron”) bombs and CAPTOR mines. However, while their ability to operate with the Navy has been demonstrated since the signing of the 1982 Air Force-Navy agreement on inter-service cooperation, there is reported to be some reluctance in both the Navy and Air Force to let the Air Force become “too” involved in the antiship role.
Bases are a major concern to the Seventh Fleet because of the vastness of its operating area and the cost of operating afloat support for the fleet. The fleet has a major shipyard available at Yokosuka, Japan, to support its ships. The Navy and Marine aircraft use airfields at Atsugi and Iwakuni in Japan.
The Marines “live” on Okinawa when not afloat. Beyond the Japanese area, the only major U. S. naval base in the Seventh Fleet’s operating area is Subic Bay, in the Philippines.
The Navy maintains tenders at Guam and Diego Garcia, which provide a limited ship support capability. U. S. forces also have the use of airfields in the Pa- cific-Indian Ocean area, including Oman on the coast of the Arabia peninsula and Djibouti at the eastern entrance to the Gulf of Aden. Still, when one considers the vast expanse of Seventh Fleet operations, the significant bases available to the fleet are few and far between. And, there are major political or operating limitations on these bases, such as how many aircraft can use an airfield and how often.
The Seventh Fleet is currently undergoing a qualitative buildup as new ships, aircraft, and weapons are becoming available to the Pacific Fleet. The most visible manifestation of this modernization has been the transfer of nuclear-pro- pelled aircraft carriers to the Pacific Fleet. The Carl Vinson (CVN-70) shifted to the Pacific in 1983 and the Nimitz (CVN-68) will move to the Pacific in 1987. The nuclear-propelled Enterprise (CVN-65) is already in the Pacific. The Nimitz move would give the Pacific Fleet three of the Navy's five nuclear carriers.
The first Aegis ship scheduled for the Pacific is the Vincennes (CG-49), which commissioned earlier this year. Other new ships are going into the Pacific Fleet, thus upgrading the capabilities of the Seventh Fleet. The total number of ships, however, will increase only marginally. Considering the area of Seventh Fleet responsibility, the number of conflict and potential crisis points in the area, and the increasing naval and air forces being deployed to the Pacific by the Soviet Union, the roles of the Seventh Fleet can only increase and become more complex.
